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International Extradition: Issues Arising Under 
the Dual Criminality Requirement 
Because of the increase in international drug trafficking, 
extradition law has become increasingly important in recent 
years. One of the most fundamental, yet least understood, re- 
quirements of extradition is that the offense charged by the 
State requesting extradition be considered criminal by both the 
requesting State and the requested State. This is known as the 
dual criminality requirement.' This comment reviews the his- 
torical background of the dual criminality requirement, analyz- 
es current problems arising under the requirement, and sub- 
mits a proposal for change. 
11. THE PAST AND PRESENT STATE OF THE 
DUAL CRIMINALITY REQUIREMENT 
The dual criminality requirement has undergone a tremen- 
dous change in the last 100 years. In the late nineteenth centu- 
ry the requirement was intended to  force a requested State to  
justify its denial of an extradition request in order to protect 
the individual facing extradition from unjust prosecution. How- 
ever, in this century dual criminality has become an unwanted 
barrier to  extradition to both requesting and requested States. 
In order to relegate this barrier to  a background position in the 
extradition process, courts are recognizing ever-expanding sce- 
narios in which the elements of the requirement may be satis- 
fied. Similarly, parties who negotiate treaties, especially in the 
last ten years, have made it clear that the dual criminality 
requirement is to  be a barrier to  extradition only when the re- 
quested State so desires. The liberalization of the dual crim- 
inality requirement-especially by the twentieth century Unit- 
1. SATYA D. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN ~NTERNATIONAI, LAW AND PRACTICE 179 
(1968) (This rule of double criminality is one of the most essential ingredients in 
the proceedings for extradition of the fugitives who have taken refuge in the 
territory of the requested state and are apprehended therein."). Dual criminality is 
also referred to as 'double criminality." For consistency's sake, I will refer to it as 
'dual criminality." However, if a source refers to the principle as "double criminali- 
ty," it will not be altered. 
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ed States' court system-is best understood in light of the 
changing political contexts in which the requirement has been 
invoked. This comment explores these shifting political winds 
and analyzes the judicial response to the increased desire for a 
weaker dual criminality requirement. 
A. The Historical Context of the Dual 
Criminality Requirement 
Extradition in various forms has existed for thousands of 
years.2 The earliest recorded extradition provision is found in 
the 1280 B.C. peace treaty between the Egyptian Pharaoh, 
Rameses 11, and the Hittite Prince, Hattulisi IIL3 Professor 
Shearer points out that "[tlreaties including provision for the 
surrender of criminals are recorded in succeeding eras of histo- 
ry, but the actual extent to which regular surrender of common 
criminals was conducted before the eighteenth century A.D. is 
a matter of some controver~y.~ 
From the beginning of its use, extradition has been largely 
a foreign relations tool, intended to foster goodwill among 
neighboring nations. Professor Bassiouni, perhaps the greatest 
living authority on international extradition, stated the follow- 
ing about the relationship between extradition and foreign 
relations: 
Because the requested and requesting participants are 
states it is clear that there is a nexus between the interests of 
those respective states and the granting or denial of extradi- 
tion. In fact, the whole history of extradition has been little 
more than a reflection of the political relations between the 
states in question. This explains why whenever a state main- 
2. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION A D WORLD PUBLIC 
ORDER 1 (1974). Professor Bassiouni reported that ''[tlhe practice originated in 
earlier non-Western civilizations such as the Egyptian, Chinese, Chaldean, and 
Assyro-Babylonian civilizations." Id. (citing Luis Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and 
International Extradition, 41 U. Dm. L.J. 525 (1964)). 
3. IVAN A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION I  INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971). 
4. Id. This controversy concerns whether extradition requests focused only on 
political offenders or if they included common criminals as well. Scholars have 
postulated that early extradition was limited to political offenders. See, e.g., ED- 
WARD CURKE, A '~'REATIsE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 18-22 (4th ed. 1903). 
However, more recent academic efforts show that there were a large number of 
early extradition requests for fugitives from common crimes as well as political of- 
fenses. See, e.g., Paul O'Higgins, The History of Extradition in British Practice, 13 
INDIAN Y.B. I ~ f i  AFF. 78-115 (1964). 
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tained in its relations with another state a certain degree of 
formality, extradition was bound in solemn formulas and 
treaties, but whenever relations between the interested states 
were informal other informal modes of rendition were resort- 
ed to as a sign of cordial cooperation.' 
Such political concerns have remained a primary motiva- 
tion behind extradition. However, there are some major differ- 
ences between extradition in ancient times and modern extradi- 
tion. As international communication and awareness increased, 
many nations became concerned about the treatment of extra- 
dited individuals. Preservation of fundamental human rights of 
the fugitive became an important factor for many nations con- 
sidering extradition requests. Because each nation had differ- 
ent standards concerning the treatment of criminals, a complex 
web of procedural requirements surrounding modern extradi- 
tion arose to ensure that a fugitive would not be prosecuted for 
an act not considered criminal by both nations or for acts not 
falling within the scope of the extradition treaty. These require- 
ments began blooming in the late eighteenth century and con- 
tinued t o  develop throughout the nineteenth century? 
Because the welfare of the individual facing extradition 
was the foundation of this procedural proliferation, protecting 
the individual's rights became a customary practice. Professor 
Bassiouni commented that "[tlhe emergence of humanitarian 
international law gave rise to a new legal status to  one of the 
participants, i.e., the individual, thus, placing some limitations 
on the power of the respective sovereigns."' Therefore, the pro- 
cedural prerequisites to granting extradition gradually 
achieved the status of international law. 
Perhaps the most significant prerequisite that took shape 
during the nineteenth century, and continues to exist today, is 
5. BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 3. 
6. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 13-16. 
7. BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 2. Wumanitarian international law" refers to a 
growing collection of international laws designed to protect universally recognized 
human rights. An example of such a right is fieedom h m  torture. For other 
examples and a more detailed discussion of this body of law, see JOSEPH M. 
SWEENEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL S Y ~ M  
579-732 (3d ed. 1988); see also BEDI, supra note 1, at 69 ("[Tlhe liberty of an 
individual is not something which can be disposed of indiscriminately in the 
absence of a positive law; therefore, a state cannot detain or apprehend the person 
sought for extradition unless the evidence submitted by the requesting state justi- 
fies prima facie judicial proceedings against the accused.")(citation omitted). 
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the dual criminality doctrine. Dual criminality prevents extra- 
dition of an individual unless the requesting State can show 
that the individual committed an act which constituted a 
"crime according to the laws of both the requesting and the 
requested  state^."^ The dual criminality requirement in United 
States extradition jurisprudence has its roots in the Jay Treaty 
of 1794. This treaty concerned extradition requests between the 
United States and Great Britain, but its provisions were sub- 
stantially adopted in other treaties.' The standardization of 
dual criminality began with Britain's Extradition Act of 1870. 
Following the adoption of this statute, many other nations 
passed legislation patterned after the British statute.'' Today, 
some form of the dual criminality requirement is found in near- 
ly all bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties." 
The almost universal recognition of dual criminality has 
made it a well-settled part of customary international law.12 
Therefore, any State wishing t o  request extradition must indi- 
cate compliance with the dual criminality requirement. The 
requested State bears the burden of ascertaining whether the 
conduct considered criminal in the requesting State is also 
criminal in the requested State.13 
In addition to protecting a fugitive from unjust punishm- 
ent, the dual criminality requirement serves other important 
purposes: 
[Tlhe double criminality rule serves the most important func- 
tion of ensuring that a person's liberty is not restricted as a 
consequence of offences not recognized as criminal by the 
requested State. The social conscience of a State is also not 
embarrassed by an obligation to extradite a person who would 
not, according to its own standards, be guilty of acts deserv- 
b g  punishment. So far as the reciprocity principle is con- 
8. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 137. 
9. See Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980) ("The requirement 
that the ads alleged be criminal in both jurisdictions is central to extradition law 
and has been embodied either explicitly or implicitly in all prior extradition 
treaties between the United States and Great Britain since the Jay Treaty of 
1794."). 
10. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 15. 
11. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, NTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW 
AND PRACTICE 326-27 (2d ed. 1987). 
12. Id. 
13. In the United States, the federal district courts generally have the burden 
of answering this question. 
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cerned, the rule ensures that a State is not required to extra- 
dite categories of offenders for which it, in return, would nev- 
er have occasion to make demand. The point is by no means 
an academic one even in these days. of growing uniformity of 
standards . . . .I4 
The ability of the dual criminality requirement to serve 
these purposes may depend on the form it is given in the appli- 
cable extradition treaty. Some treaties and laws add certain 
embellishments to the dual criminality requirement which 
expand or limit the scope of the doctrine. For example, a treaty 
or law may require that the conduct of the individual facing 
extradition be not only criminal, but also rise to the level of a 
serious  rime.'^ Other treaties and laws require a showing 
that the conduct constitutes an  extraditable crime, i.e., a crime 
which is listed in the treaty as one justifying extradition.16 
Obviously, a firm grasp on all of the possible dual criminality 
subtleties may be difficult to obtain. 
With the wide variety of possible dual criminality required 
ments, generalization is difficult. Nevertheless, Whiteman 
made the following attempt: 
A common requirement for extradition is that the acts which 
form the basis for the extradition request constitute a crime 
14. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 137-38. 
15. The "seriousness" of a crime is often determined by the minimum sentence 
which a person could receive if convicted of the crime. See, e.g., Treaty between 
the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning 
Extradition, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 11, q[ 2, 32 U.S.T. 1485, 1489-90 
(mandating that extradition is possible only if (a) "the offense is punishable under 
the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a maximum 
period exceeding one year, or (b) the enforcement of a penalty or a detention order, 
if the duration of the penalty or the detention order still to be served, or when, in 
the aggregate, several such penalties or detention orders still to be served, amount 
to at least six months."). 
16. This requirement is a correlary of dual criminality, but is handled sepa- 
rately by most courts. See, e.g., United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 
(11th Cir. 1988) (showing that extraditable offense and dual criminality require- 
ments are treated separately), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1027 (1989); Emami v. United 
States, 834 F.2d 1444, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Extradition of Rabelbauer, 638 
F. Supp. 1085, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The doctrines interrelate because under many 
extradition treaties the offense must be considered extraditable by both nations in 
order to fully satisfy the dual criminality requirement. Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 
1336, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981) ("No offense is extraditable unless it is criminal in 
both jurisdictions."); Emami, 834 F.2d at 1449 (citing Caplan for the principle that 
the offense must be extraditable in both jurisdictions in order for dual criminality 
to be satisfied). 
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under the law of both the requesting and the requested 
States. This requirement exists whether the request is made 
under a treaty or apart from a treaty and whether a list of of- 
fenses or a minimum-penalty provision is involved. In the 
case of a treaty or a law providing for extradition for offenses 
punishable by at  least a certain minimum penalty, specific 
provision is usually made that the offense must be a crime in 
both States. Where a list of offenses involved is in the treaty 
or the law, a specific provision on the point is less common. 
However, even in the absence of a specific provision, the re- 
quirement is generally imposed. The question whether the 
requirement has been met generally arises with regard to the 
law of the requested State, and where the requirement is 
covered by a specific provision in the law or treaty it is often 
cast only in terms of the law of the requested State, since, if a 
State requests extradition, it must base its request on an 
alleged violation of its law. It might be supposed that if two 
States agree, in a treaty, to a list of offenses for which extra- 
dition shall take place, they would include only those acts 
which are crimes in both States. However, questions never- 
theless may arise. Certain acts may, under the law of the 
requesting State, constitute a listed treaty offense while, 
under the law of the requested State, the same acts may 
constitute no crime or, more frequently, one not listed in the 
treaty." 
Needless to say, courts in this country and elsewhere have 
had a Micult  time determining the scope of the dual criminali- 
ty requirement. Despite the confusion, a clear trend toward a 
more permissive reading of the requirement has taken place 
throughout the course of this century. Courts began to defer to 
executive decisions regarding the desireability of extradition, 
17. MARJORIE M. W ~ M A N ,  6 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 773-74 (1968), 
quoted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 330. Professor Shearer argues that dual 
criminality is no longer dual criminality but is dual extraditability. This argument 
is based on the notion that dual criminality no longer requires simply that the 
offense be criminal in both countries, but also that the offense be listed in the re- 
spective treaty as an extraditable offense fitting a set list of requirements-such as 
that the offense is a serious crime or is on a list of extraditable crimes found 
within the treaty. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 138. This would explain the signifi- 
cant overlap between the two fundamental extradition requirements of dual crimi- 
nality and an extraditable offense. The extraditable offense requirement is beyond 
the scope of this paper, although Professor Whiteman appears to try to disentangle 
the two requirements in the excerpt above. 
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due both to the increasing complexity of ascertaining violations 
of two nations' laws and judicial recognition of the executive's 
role in establishing foreign policy. More recently, the increase 
in international crimes such as drug traf'ficking and terrorism 
have added a new urgency to allowing extradition whenever 
possible. 
- 
Even so, the dual criminality requirement continues to 
present a potential obstacle to both requesting and requested 
states, even when both nations support a decision to extradite. 
Because resources are more accommodating to a study of how 
and why United States courts have liberalized the interpreta- 
tion of the requirement-and because a worldwide survey 
would be impossiblewhat follows is an analysis of the major 
dual criminality decisions in the United States since the turn of 
the century.'' 
B. The Liberalization of the Dual 
Criminality Requirement 
During the nineteenth century, United States courts devel- 
oped a substantial body of extradition jurisp~dence. '~ During 
that time, American courts determined compliance with the 
dual criminality requirement by attempting to ascertain wheth- 
er the offense constituted a crime under the laws of the re- 
questing State as well as the requested State. Such a process 
worked well a t  the time. As one late nineteenth century com- 
mentator, Sir Edward Clarke, noted in 1874: 
In the matter of extradition, the American law was, until 
1870, better than that of any country in the world; and the 
decisions of the American judges are the best existing exposi- 
tions of the duty of extradition, in its relations at once to the 
judicial rights of nations and the general interests of the 
civilisation [sic] of the 
But as criminal codes in other countries grew more complex, 
United States courts began having a difficult time determining 
18. These are extradition decisions in which the United States is the requested 
State, and some other nation is the requesting State. These decisions are the focus 
of commentary and the foundation for nearly all recent decisions regarding dual 
criminality. 
19. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 16. 
20. EDWARD CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 28-29 (2d ed. 
1874), quoted in SHEARER, supra note 3, at 16. 
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whether conduct was criminal in foreign jurisdi~tions.~~ Profes- 
sor Shearer remarked that because judges were often totally 
unfamiliar with the practices and traditions of foreign jurispru- 
dence, it quickly became apparent that attempting to engage in 
a process of comparative criminal law was "an uncertain judi- 
cial voyage" on which United States courts were "ill-equipped 
t o  embark?' Other courts around the world faced similar dWi- 
~ulties.'~ 
As courts began to recognize these difficulties, the strictly 
comparative interpretation began to give way to looser inter- 
pretations of the dual criminality requirement. A series of U- 
nited States Supreme Court decisions during the first half of 
this century reflects this new standard? Consequently, some 
United States courts now virtually assume that the offense 
constitutes a crime in foreign jurisdictions and focus instead on 
whether the conduct constitutes a crime under United States 
law.25 This is but one aspect of the liberalization of the dual 
21. John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 
1441, 1460 (1988). 
22. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 139; see also Kester, supra note 21, at 1460 
("Most United States judges and attorneys . . . have no expertise in comparative 
law, particularly in its esoteric subcategory of comparative criminal law . . . . Our 
courts usually are not comfortable with what appear to be overly refined argu- 
ments that seek to distinguish between the elements of United States crimes and 
their foreign counterparts."). 
23. Dual criminality was especially problematic for foreign courts considering 
U.S. extradition requests because the U.S. requests were often based on complex 
criminal statutes such as RICO and CCE. These statutes are uniquely American, 
having no foreign counterparts. Thus, a strict interpretation of the dual criminality 
requirement by foreign courts would make extradition impossible even when public 
policy dictated a contrary result. See infia notes 67-89 and accompanying text. 
Courts in the United States have faced similar problems when considering other 
nations' drug and terrorism prevention legislation. 
See infia notes 29-44 and accompanying text. 
For example, the Tenth Circuit stated: 
While on its face the doctrine of dual criminality seems to require a 
MI-blown inquiry into both the question of whether the alleged acts 
would violate American law and the question of whether the alleged acts 
constitute a violation of the British statutes, we think that an extensive 
investigation of British law would be inappropriate. For one thing, we 
"are not expected to become experts in the laws of foreign nations." 
Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). For an 
extreme example of a court all but ignoring the dual criminality requirement, see 
United States v. Deaton, 448 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (After looking at the 
purposes of the dual criminality requirement, and finding that the conduct consti- 
tuted a crime under United States law, the court decided that it was "unnecessary 
to look for a counterpart in the criminal law of West Germany."). Id. at 536, a f d ,  
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criminality requirement, but i t  signifies the twentieth century 
trend toward the deferential in abstracto method of dual crirni- 
nality interpretation rather than the more probing inquiries of 
the traditional in concreto method. Clearly the policy underly- 
ing this change is the desire to rebalance the individual rights 
of the accused in light of a worldwide effort to suppress inter- 
national crimes. A review of this shift in methodology, and the 
United States Supreme Court decisions underlying the change, 
follows. 
1. In concreto and in abstracto methods of interpreting the 
dual criminality requirement 
The most sigdicant liberalization of dual criminality in 
the United States concerned the method used to apply the dual 
criminality requirement to the facts of a specific case. Histori- 
cally, two different approaches have been used to interpret the 
requirement: in concreto or in abstracto. Under the in concreto 
method, the courts rely on the label of the domestic crime and 
apply a strict analysis of its elements to the parallel law of the 
requesting State. If the laws match, the court then applies the 
domestic law to the actions of the party facing extradition." 
In other words, if the crime for which the requesting State 
wishes to prosecute does not have an exact domestic coroll- 
ary-including identical elements-then the request for extra- 
dition will be turned down. 
A court applying the in abstracto standard, by contrast, re- 
views the criminality of the conduct regardless of the label and 
597 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1979). Kester cited this case as a "particularly egregious 
example of a court ignoring the requirement of dual criminality." Kester, supra 
note 21, at 1460. 
Some foreign courts have liberalized the dual criminality requirement by asking 
not whether the conduct is an offense under laws of the requested State, but in- 
stead whether the conduct is an offense under the laws of the requesting State. 
See, e.g., United States v. Link & Green, 21 I.L.R. 234 (Que. 1954). In this case 
the Supreme Court of Quebec granted the request of the United States to extradite 
two fugitives fleeing Michigan indictments on charges of forgery and obtaining 
money by false pretenses. Professor Bassiouni commented that the "unusual feature 
of this case is that the issue was not whether the offense charged constituted . . . 
an offense in the requested state but whether it was an offense under the laws of 
the requesting state." BASSIOUNI, supm note 2, at 345. 
26. S.Z. Feller, The Significance of the Requirement of Double Criminali6y in the 
Law of Extrudition, 10 ISR. L. REV. 51, 66-76 (1975) (providing a general discussion 
of the concepts of in abstntcto and in concreto interpretation of the dual criminality 
requirement). 
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elements of the alleged crime.27 Under this standard, the con- 
duct must simply be criminal in both jurisdictions; no parallel 
offense is required. Although United States courts adhered to  
the in concreto interpretation prior to the turn of the century, 
since that time the United States has become a solidly in ab- 
stract~ j urisdiction? 
The first case which signalled the United States' shift from 
one interpretational extreme toward the other was Wright v. 
Henkel?9 Wright involved a request by the British government 
to extradite a man who had participated in a fraudulent 
scheme in England and then fled to New York. The extradit- 
able offense listed in the treaty was fraud. The problem arose 
from the fact that the elements for a prima facie case of fraud 
differed in the two jurisdictions, raising dual criminality con- 
cerns. The elements of the English version of the crime differed 
only slightly from a similar New York provision. Nevertheless, 
the defendant, Wright, claimed that his extradition was pre- 
cluded by the dual criminality requirement. In rejecting Wri- 
ght's claim, the Court noted that the elements of the British 
and United States version of the crime were different but held 
that because the two were "substantially analogous," the dual 
criminality requirement had been satisfied.s0 
The next major case addressing the dual criminality require- 
ment was Collins v. Loi~el.~' Rather than reining in the ex- 
pansive reading of the dual criminality requirement taken by 
the Court in Wright, the Collins Court continued the trend. In 
Collins, the defendant allegedly made a promise he never in- 
tended to keep in exchange for a pearl button. The British 
crime for such action was known as cheating, while the analo- 
gous U.S. crime was obtaining property by false pretenses. 
Collins argued that cheating was not among the offenses listed 
as extraditable in the treaty between the U.S. and Great Brit- 
ain and that the crime of cheating was a different offense than 
obtaining property by false pretenses.s2 Specifically he claimed 
that "to convict of cheating it is sufficient to prove a promise of 
future performance which the promisor does not intend to per- 
27. BASSIOW, supra note 2, at 322. 
28. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
29. 190 U.S. 40 (1903). 
30. Id. at 58. 
31. 259 U.S. 309 (1922). 
32. Id. at 311. 
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form, while to  convict of obtaining property by false pretense it 
is essential that there be a false representation of a state of 
things past or present."33 In response to this argument, the 
Court held that 
[tlhe law does not require that the name by which the crime 
is described in the two countries shall be the same; nor that 
the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other 
respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the 
particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions." 
This language altered the Wrght test by no longer requir- 
ing that the two versions of the alleged crime be substantially 
analogous. Instead, the conduct simply had to be considered 
criminal under any state or federal law in both jurisdictions. 
Although this case represents an extension of the requesting 
State's powers to extradite, it arguably comports with a com- 
mon sense interpretation of the dual criminality doctrine. If the 
dual criminality doctrine means what its title suggests, then 
evidence that the conduct is criminal in both jurisdictions 
should be enough to assure the requested State that extradi- 
tion is justified. However, there is a potential problem with this 
approach. If the requesting State has a very low standard of 
proof with a very high penalty for conviction when compared' 
with the standards and penalties of the requested State, the 
rights of the individual may be in jeopardy.35 Nevertheless, 
the policies underlying the trend toward liberalization favor the 
needs of nations rather than individuals. Thus, this concern did 
not trouble the Court in Wright. 
The next step in liberalizing the judicial interpretation of 
the dual criminality requirement was taken in Factor v. 
Laubenhei~ner.~~ Like Wright and Collins, Factor involved an 
extradition request from Great Britain. The defendant in Fac- 
tor allegedly had committed the British crime of receiving sto- 
len property. In an incredibly broad reading of the dual crimi- 
nality requirement, the Court held that even though the asy- 
lum state of Illinois did not consider the defendant's conduct 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 312. 
35. For a discussion of potential problems caused by different standards of 
criminal procedure and punishment, see Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 
908-09 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973). 
36. 290 U.S. 276 (1933). 
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criminal, the dual criminality requirement was nevertheless 
satisfied because the conduct constituted a crime under the 
laws of the majority of other states. The Court also stated that 
treaties should be liberally applied to effectuate the intent of 
the parties. Therefore, because the dual criminality require- 
ment was not specifically stated in the treaty between the 
United States and Great Britain, the Court reasoned that the 
requirement should not act as a barrier to extradition. Bas- 
siouni correctly notes that the Treaty actually did contain the 
dual criminality requirement, but the specific extraditable 
offense at issue in the case did not restate the requirement. 
Because of this, the Court determined that while the dual crim- 
inality requirement may apply to some parts of the Treaty, it 
did not apply to  the offense in Factor? 
If the Court simply wished to permit the extradition re- 
quest, it could have taken an easier path. For example, as 
Justice Butler noted in his dissent, the conduct engaged in by 
the defendant could have been construed as criminal under 
several provisions of Illinois law: 
[Tlhe record shows [that the defendant] was a party to the 
fraud by which the money was obtained, and that, as obtain- 
ing by false pretenses and participation in that offense are 
both criminal in Illinois and extraditable, it must be held that 
that extradition of the petitioner would be within the rule. 
The court [sic] does not take that point, and therefore it need 
not be considered here. It is mentioned for the purpose of dis- 
closing the principal, if not indeed the sole, ground upon 
which extradition is now claimed.38 
Because the defendant's conduct would have been considered 
criminal under the laws of both jurisdictions, the test proclaim- 
ed in Collins would have been met.39 But rather than staying 
with the previously articulated standard, the Court instead 
chose to  open up new ground, expanding the dual criminality 
test almost beyond recognition. The Court justified itself by 
37. BASSIOUNI, supm note 11, at 338. What Factor in effect required was that 
the treaty contain the dual criminality requirement provision within each listed 
extraditable offense in order for that requirement to preclude extradition. By so 
doing, the Court ignored the previous precedent which had held that the dual 
criminality requirement was a part of customary international law and therefore 
implicit throughout all treaties. See id. at 327, 338. 
38. Factor, 290 U.S. at 308, quoted by SHEARER, supra note 3, at 145. 
39. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
DUAL CRIMINALITY REQUIREMENT 
stating: 
The obligation to do what some nations have done volun- 
tarily, in the interest of justice and friendly international 
relationships . . . should be construed more liberally than a 
criminal statute or the technical requirements of criminal 
procedure . . . . It has been the policy of our own government, 
as of others, in entering into extradition treaties, to name as 
treaty offenses only those generally recognized as criminal by 
the laws in force within its own territory. But that policy 
when camed into effect by treaty designation of offenses with 
respect to which extradition is to be granted, affords no ade- 
quate basis for declining to construe the treaty in accordance 
with its language, or for saying that its obligation, in the 
absence of some express requirement, is conditioned on the 
criminality of the offense charged according to the laws of the 
particular place of a s y l ~ m . ~  
From this statement, one can discern that the Court found that 
the policies behind interpreting treaties broadly outweigh those 
supporting a strict application of the dual criminality require- 
ment. 
As pointed out by Professor Bassiouni, the problem with an 
approach as broad as Factor's is that it in essence ignores dual 
criminality altogether: "[Factor] illustrates . . . that a broad [in 
abstract01 interpretation of. . . double criminality leads to the 
same result as its nonapplicability when it is coupled with a 
broad interpretation of what constitutes the requirement of 
extraditable offenses.""' However, if the policy goal underlying 
the modern dual criminality requirement is to strike a new 
balance between individual rights and the worldwide effort to 
combat international crime, then the Factor approach may give 
courts the necessary latitude to weigh and balance each of 
these important interests. 
Some lower courts have since rejected the Factor interpre- 
tation as overly broad and have instead looked to the Collins 
standard which requires that the particular acts must simply 
be criminal in both jurisdictions? Other courts cite Factor as 
40. 290 U.S. at 298-300 (citations omitted), quoted in BASSIOUNI, supm note 11, 
at 338. 
41. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 339. 
42. Because Factor did not explicitly overrule Collins, some lower courts have 
chosen to apply CoUins without even acknowledging Factor. See, e.g., United States 
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authority for the principle that treaties should be construed 
liberally but rely on Wright and Collins for dual criminality 
precedent." Some lower courts have even returned exclusively 
to the Wright standard, which requires that the codification of 
the conduct as a crime in the two jurisdictions be "substantially 
 analogous.'^ 
2. Liberalization through choice of law 
Choice of law issues have also troubled courts seeking to 
interpret the dual criminality requirement. This area is partic- 
ularly difficult for U.S. courts because of the almost unique 
way in which the United States has bifurcated its criminal law 
system. Whereas most nations have a single criminal code, 
early concerns regarding the allocation of power in the United 
States led to  the development of different criminal codes in 
each state as well as a body of federal criminal law." Because 
dual criminality requires that the offense be criminal under the 
laws of both the requesting and the requested States, the ques- 
tion arises whether this means federal law or state law, or 
both. Part of the problem is that many bilateral extradition 
treaties entered into by the United States contain language 
mandating that the conduct must be considered criminal by 
both contracting parties. Because individual states cannot con- 
tract with another nation, they are clearly not a contracting 
party." Ostensibly then, state law should not apply. But be- 
v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 
F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988); United States a rel. 
Rauch v. Stockinger, 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959), reh'g 
denied, 361 U.S. 973 (1960). But see United States v. Deaton, 448 F. Supp. 532, 
536 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (following the Factor analysis), afpd, 597 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
43. See, e.g., Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 719 (10th Cir. 1989); In re 
Sindona, 584 F. Supp. 1437, 1447 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
44. See, e.g., Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 851 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Although we 
do not accept appellant's argument that strict congruity of offenses is necessary to 
meet the test of double criminality, we agree that the offenses of the two countries 
must be substantially analogous."); see also Oen Ym-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 
1400, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting Wright's "substantially analogousn stan- 
dard), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Russell v. United States, 789 F.2d 801, 
803 (9th Cir. 1986). 
45. Federalism, however, is not the sole source of the diverse bodies of United 
States criminal law. Other nations, such as Germany, also have one national gov- 
ernment along with separate governments for each state, but have only one na- 
tional criminal code. 
46. Sindona, 584 F. Supp. at 1447. 
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cause so many common crimes under state law and the law of 
foreign States have no U.S. federal counterpart, it would be 
very difficult for the dual criminality requirement ever to be 
met. United States courts have recognized this;'7 and although- 
divided on the question, most courts heed Factor's ghost and 
follow the trend toward a permissive reading of the dual crimi- 
nal requirement allowing federal or state law to apply." 
As it loosened the general interpretation of the dual crimi- 
nality requirement, the Wright-Collins-Factor line of cases also 
liberalized the choice of law question. In Wright, the United 
States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether con- 
duct could be considered criminal under the laws of the asylum 
state when there was no federal law prohibiting the conduct. 
The Court determined that the language of the treaty should 
be interpreted broadly to  allow state as well as federal law to  
be invoked in order to meet the requirement." Similarly, in 
Collins the Supreme Court held that criminality in the request- 
ed State could be shown through state law.50 The Factor deci- 
sion;l in addition to expanding the ways in which the dual 
47. See, e.g., id. ("Although Article 11 of the Treaty b tween  the United States 
and Italy] requiring that offenses be 'punishable by the laws of both Contracting 
Parties' if read literally would preclude reference to the laws of New York since 
New York is not a Contracting Party, it is well settled that treaties are to be con- 
strued liberally rather than literally.") (citing Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 
276, 293 (1933)). 
48. One district court put it this way: 
A majority view, which this court adopts, is that it is only necessary to  
determine that the ads  on which the foreign charges are based are pro- 
scribed by similar criminal provisions of federal law, the law of the asy- 
lum state or the law of the preponderance of states. This broad interpre- 
tation comports with the basic principle of international law that treaties 
should be construed to enlarge the rights of the parties. 
In re Extradition of Rushinowski, 574 F. Supp. 1439, 1446 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (citing 
Factor, 290 U.S. at 293-94, for the second proposition) (citations omitted). 
49. The Court gave the following rationale for its broad reading: 
As the State of New York was the place where the accused was found 
and in legal effed the asylum to which he had fled, is the language of 
the treaty, "made criminal by the laws of both countries," to be interpret- 
ed as limiting its scope to ads  of Congress, and eliminating the operation 
of the laws of the States? That view would largely defeat the object of 
our extradition treaties by ignoring the fad that for nearly all crimes and 
misdemeanors the laws of the States, and not the enactments of Con- 
gress, must be looked to for the definition of the offence [sic]. 
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58-59 (1903) (citation omitted). 
50. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 314-15 (1922). 
51. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). 
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criminality requirement could be satisfied, also added a new 
twist to  the choice of law questionh Factor, the Court consid- 
ered whether conduct which was clearly not criminal under the 
laws of the asylum state could nevertheless meet the dual 
criminality requirement. The Court held that dual criminality 
was satisfied because the two nations, Great Britain and the 
United States, had inserted the charged offense into their ex- 
tradition treaty as an extraditable crime.52 Because of this 
reasoning, a showing by the fugitive that his conduct was not 
criminal under the law of the asylum state was not enough to 
escape extradition. Factor made clear that the laws of the asy- 
lum state were not controlling, clarifying some confusion which 
had arisen after Wright and Collins.53 According to the Factor 
Court, an underlying rationale for the decision was the desire 
to avoid construing a treaty in a way that would cause the 
success of extradition requests by foreign nations to vary from 
state to state.54 Modern courts have generally complied with 
Factor in this regard. 
For example, the Second Circuit in Shapiro v. 
~ e r r a n d i n a ~ ~  looked to  the language of the applicable treaty to 
determine which law to apply in ascertaining the criminality of 
the conduct. The defendant in Shcrpiro "demonstrate[d] convinc- 
ingly" that his conduct was not criminal under the the laws of 
the asylum state.56 But rather than concluding that the dual 
criminality requirement was not satisfied, the court stated that 
"the Treaty refers not to the 'laws of the place where the per- 
son sought shall be found'. . . but to the laws of both parties.' 
Since the United States rather than New York is a party to the 
Treaty, the Treaty impels us to  look to  the laws of the federal 
government. . . ."' The court then found that, based on feder- 
al law, the defendant was extraditable on some, but not all, of 
the charges." 
One modern court addressed a question left unanswered by 
52. Id. at 299-300. 
53. Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 848 (1st Cir. 1980) (%I [Factor], the Court 
addressed the choice of law principle implicit in Wright and Collins that 
extraditability could be established only on the basis of the asylum state's law."). 
54. Factor, 290 U.S. at 300. 
55. 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 US. 884 (1973). 
56. Id. at 910. 
57. Id. (citations omitted). 
58. Id. at 910-14. 
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the earlier cases: whether conduct which is criminal under the 
laws of the asylum state but not under the laws of the prepon- 
derance of states satisfies dual criminality. In Brauch v. Ra- 
iche," the First Circuit found that existing United States Su- 
preme Court opinions were not dispositive of this question.60 
The Brauch court determined that an expansive reading of the 
dual criminality requirement was in order-following the liber- 
al treaty interpretation validated by Factor? To that extent, 
the court was consistent with Factor. However, the court went 
considerably further, construing Factor as supporting a choice 
of law rule which would grant extradition &om the asylum 
state if the conduct was criminal under the laws of that state 
but non-criminal in the majority of other states.62 This would 
appear to be at  odds with Factor's express rationale that con- 
sistency among the states is more important than whether the 
conduct is criminal under the law of the asylum state. 
Nevertheless, the current state of the law appears to  be 
that if the offense is considered criminal under federal law, the 
law of the asylum state, or under the law of the preponderance 
of states, the dual criminality requirement is satisfied.s3 This 
reflects modern balancing. Courts liberally grant extradition for 
the sake of suppressing international crime, but because the 
act must be criminal under one of these bodies of law, the 
rights of the individual are also protected. 
59. 618 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1980). 
60. Id. at 850 ('We find neither the Supreme Court precedents nor the recent 
cases construing similar extradition treaties to be dispositive of the choice of law 
question in this case."). 
61. Id. at 848. 
62. Id. at 849 ("me do not believe [that Factor's] disapproval of extraditability 
varyjng with state law would extend to the situation in which one state's law 
might confer extraditability, while that of the preponderance of the states would 
not."). 
63. See, e.g, id. at 851; Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d 492, 496 
(9th Cir. 1987) ("In assessing dual criminality, courts examine 'similar [criminal] 
provisions of federal law or, if none, the law of the place where the fugitive is 
found or, if none, the law of the preponderance of states."') (citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1262 
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (Yn sum, we conclude that neither the laws of this state, nor the 
United States, nor a healthy majority of the states in this country recognize the 
commercial bribery contemplated by 8 383 of the Canadian Criminal Code, with 
the result that such conduct is not criminal 'according to the laws of the place 
where the . . . person so charged shall be found' within the meaning of Article X 
of the instant treaty."). 
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111. PROSECUTORIAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY 
THE DUAL CRIMINALITY REQUIREMENT 
Courts have offered differing rationales for weakening the 
dual criminality requirement's potential to foil a desired extra- 
dition attempt." Even so, consistently underlying the dual 
criminality decisions has been the sentiment that the require- 
ment may be relaxed-thus preserving international interest in 
extraditing an individual which both the requesting and re- 
quested States wish to extradite-while continuing to protect 
individuals from unjust foreign prosecution. The worldwide 
interest in liberal extradition policies has grown even stronger 
in the last twenty years as savvy international drug traflickers 
and terrorists seek to exploit the technicalities of the dual crim- 
inality requirement in order to avoid prosecution." 
A. The Dual Criminality Requirement and 
Complex Criminal Statutes 
The problems created worldwide by drug traflicking are 
staggering. Worldwide societal costs, including the cost of fight- 
ing the crime which accompanies the drug trade, exceed one 
hundred billion dollars annually.66 In response, many govern- 
ments, including the United States, have declared a "war on 
drugs."' Because drug trafficking is international in scope,s8 
international extradition of drug criminals has become very 
important to  the war on drugs. Extradition requests are steadi- 
ly increasing worldwide as a direct result of the battle against 
the drug trade? Many countries view extradition of drug crim- 
inals--especially to  the United States-as essential, particular- 
ly "in those cases where the requested government is unable to 
keep major drug traffickers incarcerated because of the intimi- 
64. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
65. See, e.g., Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 
925 F.2d 615 (2d. Cir. 1991). 
66. J. Richard Barnett, Comment, Extradition Treaty Improvements to Combat 
Drug Traficking, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COW. L. 285-90 (1985). 
67. See Andrea M. Grilli, Note, Preventing Billions from Being Washed Offshore: 
A Growing Approach to Stopping International Drug Tmmking, 14 SYRACU~E J. 
INT'L L. & COM. 65 (1987). 
68. Barnett, supra note 66, at 287. 
69. Barbara Sicalides, Comment, RICO, CCE, and Internutional Extradition, 62 
TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1283 n.20 (1989). 
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dation, through force and corruption, of public ~ E c i a l s . " ~ ~  Ther- 
efore, denial of extradition based solely on dual criminality has 
become increasingly unpopular. 
However, United States laws often used as grounds for 
extradition to the United States of international drug 
criminals, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga- 
nizations ("RICO") and Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE- 
") Acts," are sometimes ruled invalid for purposes of interna- 
tional extradition because they fail the dual criminality re- 
q ~ i r e m e n t . ~ ~  One commentator explained why RICO and CCE 
offenses often fail the dual criminality requirement: 
To sustain a conviction under RICO, the prosecution must 
demonstrate that the defendant conducted a pattern of racke- 
teering activity, which is defined as the commission of at  least 
two underlying predicate acts within ten years of each other. 
Once a pattern of racketeering activity is established, the 
prosecution must prove that the defendant engaged in any 
one of four different [prohibited] activities: (1) investing in- 
come derived from a pattern of racketeering in an enterprise 
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce; (2) acquiring rui 
interest in such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeer- 
ing; (3) operating such an enterprise through racketeering; or 
(4) conspiring to do any of the preceding. This second level of 
proof required under RICO may involve conduct that does not 
70. Id. at 1316. 
71. These statutes are popular among prosecutors because of their harsh pen- 
alties: "A drug offender convided of CCE . . . faces a term . . . of twenty years to 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole. For a single RICO violation, im- 
prisonment may be for up to twenty years." Steven A. Bernholz et al., Problems of 
Double CriminaliCy: Intenational Extradition in CCE and RICO Cases, RUAL, Jan. 
1985, at 58, 60. 
72. Sicalides, supra note 69, at  1283; see also Steven A. Bernholz et al., Inter- 
national Extradition in Drug Cases, 10 N.C. J .  INT'L L. & COM. REG. 353, 358 
(1985) ("Because CCE and RICO are solely creatures of United States law, a 
defendant whose extradition is sought by the United States on such charges may 
argue successfully that the foreign country cannot extradite him, because these 
crimes do not constitute extraditable offenses under the treaty [and hence fail to 
meet the dual criminality requirement].") Sandi R. Murphy, Comment, Drug 
Diplomacy and the Supply-side Strategy: A Survey of United States Practice, 43 
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1290-91 (1990) ("In drug cases, the United States is often not 
able to request extradition for a specific crime, such as continuing criminal en- 
terprise crimes, because the offense has no counterpart in the law of the foreign 
country."). 
Note also that whereas dual criminality problems such as choice of law are 
unique to United States courts, the dual criminality problems presented by CCE 
and RICO are unique to foreign courts. 
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constitute criminal offenses in the requested state. Conse- 
quently . . . the double criminality principle . . . would bar the 
surrender of any RICO offenders requested by the United 
States. 
The result is the same if the requested state rigidly ap- 
plies the double criminality requirement to violations under 
CCE . . . . In order to successfully convict under CCE, the 
prosecution must also establish that the defendant occupies a 
management position in a group of a t  least five other individ- 
uals from which the defendant obtains substantial income or 
resources. Although the predicates underlying the CCE stat- 
ute are, like RICO, commonly recognized offenses, the second 
level of proof required in a CCE prosecution-that the defen- 
dant occupy a supervisory po sition-arguably precludes extra- 
dition under a strict application of [the dual] criminality [re- 
quirement] because most other nations do not specifically 
make occupying a management position in a drug operation 
substantive  rimes.'^ 
Despite the fact that CCE and RICO seem to present substan- 
tial barriers to extradition because they fail to meet the dual 
criminality requirement, international pressure to combat the 
drug crisis has led some foreign courts to hold that CCE and 
RICO claims are extraditable. Clearly such a finding can only 
be supported by the broadest interpretation of the dual crimi- 
nality requirement." 
For example, in Sudar v. u.SA.," a Canadian court grant- ' 
ed the extradition of an individual wanted in the United States 
on RICO charges. The defendant in Sudur argued that extradi- 
tion would violate the principle of dual criminality. The Ontario 
Supreme Court, however, held that the dual criminality requir- 
ement was met because the RICO charges involved murder, 
arson, conspiracy, and extortion, and such crimes were also 
73. Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1310-11 (citations omitted); see also Bernholz et 
al., supra note 71, at 60 ("Because CCE and RICO are unique to U.S. law, defen- 
dants whose extradition is sought by the United States on CCE and RICO charges 
may successfully argue that the foreign country cannot extradite them because 
their crimes do not constitute extraditable offenses under the applicable treaty.?; 
Kester, supm note 21, at 1462 (The requirement of dual criminality should stand 
as an important bar to extradition in many cases involving federal rather than 
state crimes, for most federal offenses are structured much differently from com- 
mon law antecedents. The barrier it creates is most apparent when the United 
States is the party seeking extradition of a person from abroad."). 
74. Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1310. 
75. 25 S.C.R. 3d 183 (Can. 1981). 
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criminal in Canada. 
Similarly, the Australian High Court, when presented with 
a U.S. request to extradite a person facing CCE charges, deter- 
mined that such an offense was extraditable despite the fact 
that no similar charge existed under Australian law. The court 
addressed possible dual criminality problems by using the fol- 
lowing reasoning: 
As a generally accepted limitation of obligations under extra- 
dition treaties, [double criminality] avoids the international 
complications and ill-will which are likely to result from an 
ad hoc refbsal of extradition based on the unacceptability to 
the requested state of particular laws of a requesting state. 
The utility of the principle of double criminality is, however, 
likely to be outweighed by the impediment which it repre- 
sents to the advancement of criminal justice if its content is 
defined in over-technical terms which would preclude extradi- 
tion by reason of technical differences between legal systems 
notwithstanding that the acts alleged against the accused 
involve serious criminality under the law of both the request- 
ing and requested  state^.'^ 
Such logic comports with reasoning used by United States 
courts during this century as they determined that an expan- 
sive reading of the dual criminality requirement was justified 
for reasons mentioned above.77 Nevertheless, some internation- 
al scholars fear that individual rights are being recklessly en- 
dangered and have criticized decisions such as Sudar and Riley 
as unduly broad interpretations of the dual criminality require- 
ment.78 
Despite such sentiment, courts in the United States seem 
willing to accept the liberal approach to dual criminality taken 
by foreign courts. This is especially true when drug offenses are 
involved. For example, in United States v. ~evy," the Tenth 
Circuit heard the appeal of a man extradited to the United 
States from Hong Kong on CCE charges, for which he was later 
76. Riley v. Commonwealth, 60 A.L.J.R. 106, 111 (Austl. 1985), quoted by 
Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1314. 
77. The Australian High Court's language bears resemblance to language from Fac- 
tor v. Laubenheirner, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). See supra note 40 and accompanying 
text. 
78. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 354; Bernholz et al., supra note 72, 
at 361-64. 
79. 905 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct 759 (1991). 
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convicted. The appellant claimed that "CCE is not an extradit- 
able offense because of the lack of a crime in Hong Kong hav- 
ing analogous elements."80 The court responded that such an 
argument "misstates the nature of the dual criminality require- 
ment." The court held instead that, "[tlhe focus of dual crimi- 
nality is not on how the crime is defined in the particular stat- 
utes the defendant is accused of violating; it is on the criminali- 
ty of the defendant's alleged conduct."81 Therefore, the court 
determined that because the basis of the CCE charge was the 
defendant's participation in a cocaine trafficking operation and 
such conduct was proscribed by the laws of both the requesting 
and requested State, the dual criminality requirement had 
been ~atisfied?~ 
However, some nations have not adopted the United Sta- 
tes' liberal view of the dual criminality requirement and, conse- 
quently, routinely deny extradition requests from the United 
States based on CCE and RICO charges.83 Usually nations 
80. Id. at 328. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. Other recent decisions also show United States courts' willingness to 
stretch the dual criminality requirement in whatever manner is necessary in order 
to convict drug traffickers. In Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 
1990), a#'d 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1991), a U.S. district court granted a request by 
the Italian government to extradite a fugitive wanted for conspiracy to engage in 
the trafficking of narcotics. Bassiouni himself appeared at the trial on behalf of the 
defendant. Even so, the court-quoting Bassiouni-held that the extradition request 
was justified. Although a crime with similar elements was not to be found in 
United States state or federal law, the court nevertheless found that the dual 
criminality requirement had been satisfied because the conduct was criminal in 
both jurisdictions. Id. at 372-73. 
Interestingly, the court in Spatda devoted a substantial portion of its opinion 
to justifying its decision on the grounds that the executive branch of government 
supported the extradition request. For example, the court gave great deference to 
the political considerations behind extradition of drug criminals, stating that 
"undue interference with the diplomatic process of extradition by the judicial 
branch is as unseemly and disruptive of separation of powers and of the foreign 
relations of the nation as any judicial foray into this very political realm." Id. at 
370. Therefore, the court relegated its role to simply determining "whether the 
executive branch is authorized by statute and treaty to honor a particular extradi- 
tion request." Id. 
83. Bernholz et al., supra note 72, at 357-58; see also Sicalides, supra note 69, 
at 1283 (To prosecute drug producers who conduct their illicit activities outside 
the United States, prosecutors must extradite them from the nations in which they 
have asylum. The effectiveness of RICO and CCE [in combatting the international 
drug problem], however, have [sic] been severely limited by the refusal of some 
nations to extradite individuals who import narcotics into the United 
states . . . ."). 
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deny such extradition requests due to respect for past decisions 
which utilized a strict reading of dual ~r iminal i ty .~~ For exam- 
ple, last year the Swiss Justice Department received a request 
from the United States to extradite the now famous interna- 
tional financier Adnan Khashoggi. Although the Swiss Justice 
Department agreed to turn over Khashoggi to face fraud charg- 
es, it refused to extradite him on RICO charges. The rationale 
for the decision was that "[elxtradition [on the RICO charges] 
is not possible because of the lack of mutual ~riminality."~~ 
Such nations may be missing the point of the dual crimi- 
nality requirement. The dual criminality requirement is now 
based largely on principles of international comity and coopera- 
tion in combatting crimes. For example, since fighting the drug 
trade is an international goal, dual criminality barring extradi- 
tion of drug criminals would stand the requirement on its head. 
The following comment's reasoning is compelling: 
In essence, double criminality is a reciprocity require- 
ment that is intended to ensure states that they can depend 
on corresponding treatment, and that no state will be forced 
to use its processes to surrender an individual, possibly one of 
its own nationals, to be prosecuted and punished for conduct 
that the requested state does not deem deserving of punish- 
ment. Reciprocity is required throughout extradition agree- 
ments because of political considerations and the sovereignty 
doctrine. Even though no other nation has enacted statutes 
with . . . structures similar to RICO and CCE, most nations 
condemn the activities that these two statutes target and all 
have their own 1egislati;on aimed at  the same final 
result-elimination of narcotics trafficking. International 
conventions such as the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
evidence the international community's resolve to stem nar- 
cotics trafficking. Reciprocity and sovereignty do not require 
that conduct universally considered abhorrent go unpunished 
because of the use of unusual elements designed to reach the 
worst offenders . . . . 
. . . .  
Because international cooperation is essential in the battle 
against narcotics traffickers, and most nations consider drug 
84. Another reason some nations retain the stricter view of dual criminality is 
fear of terrorist reprisals by drug traffickers who fear extradition to the United 
States. See infra note 130. 
85. Swiss Extradite Khashoggi to Face U.S. Fraud Charges, REXJTERS NEWS RE- 
POWS, July 19, 1989, AM Cycle. 
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trafficking illegal, there is no need for rigid application of the 
double criminality requirement in this context.86 
Some would disagree, claiming that international doctrines 
such as dual criminality should be strictly interpreted, thereby 
always barring extradition based on RICO or CCE charges? 
However, the integrity of dual criminality can arguably be 
preserved in cases where the requested State does not wish to  
extradite. Should this occur, the requested State could simply 
refuse the request based on exceptions to  the duty to extradite 
established by international law." This would increase the 
effectiveness of CCE and RICO in combatting the international 
drug problem.'' Nevertheless, disagreement remains over how 
far to  extend the dual criminality principle when a fugitive 
faces RICO or CCE charges. 
B. The "Special Use" Jurisdictional 
Problem of the Dual Criminality Requirement 
Another area in which the dual criminality requirement 
86. Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1313-14 (citations omitted). Bedi also supports 
this position: 
The law of extradition is an instrvment of international co-operation for 
the suppression of crime, in which all nations have a common interest, 
because crime constitutes a menace to any human society and weakens 
the very foundations of social life. If by simply placing himself outside the 
territory of the state in which he has committed a crime, a criminal plac- 
es himself beyond the reach of the law which he has violated and if so 
without any risk he manages to escape penalty attached to his guilt by 
simply fleeing to a foreign country, there will be a complete failure of jus- 
tice. 
BEDI, supra note 1, at 47-48, quoted in Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1315. 
87. See, e.g., Bernholz et al., supra note 71, at 61-63: 
[Wlhen all the elements [of CCE] are taken together, it is plain that 
the offense is an exclusive genus of US. criminal law. As the crime is 
not recognized as punishable in foreign countries, it cannot satisfy the 
principle of double criminality and hence cannot be an extraditable of- 
fense. 
. . . .  
Because RICO is unknown to foreign law, if the United States seeks the 
extradition of an alleged drug offender for a RICO offense, the requested 
country should not grant the warrant. 
Id. 
88. Such exceptions could include the political offense exception, or language 
included in many treaties which states that the dual criminality requirement is to 
be liberally interpreted. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 10-12. 
89. Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1316. 
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has caused problems is its use in cases of extraterritorial 
crimes. Most problematic are terrorist ads  against nationals of 
one country who are in another country,gO and participation in 
international drug trafficking conspira~ies.~~ Following such 
conduct, requested States may justifiably refuse an extradition 
request on the ground that the requesting State has no juris- 
diction over extraterritorial crimes.Q2 This occurs when the 
jurisdictional theory used by the requesting State is not recog- 
nized by the requested State. In this situation, the offense is 
not considered extraditable under the laws of the requesting 
State. Therefore the dual criminality principle bars extradition. 
This is known as the "special use" of the dual criminality re- 
q~irement.'~ 
Because this "special use" of the dual criminality requirement 
presents another obstacle to the modern balance between indi- 
vidual rights and the international interest in suppressing 
crime, courts have sought to  relax this aspect of dual criminali- 
ty as well. However, as yet no principled method has been 
found to  overcome this obstacle due to the variety of often mu- 
tually exclusive jurisdictional theories utilized by different na- 
tions. An examination of some of these theories of extraterrito- 
rial jurisdiction and their potential inapplicability in the areas 
of international drug trafficking conspiracies or acts of interna- 
tional terrorism follows. 
1. The five traditional bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
There are five traditional bases of jurisdiction potentially 
covering extraterritorial acts: territorial, protective, nationali- 
ty," passive personality, and universality." While all of 
90. See infia notes 116-20 and accompanying text. 
91. Seeid. 
92. Seeid. 
93. Christopher L. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and 
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REV 685, 744-45. Professor 
Blakesley made the following comment about this "special use" of the dual crimi- 
nality requirement: 
A specialized notion of double criminality that generally works to  deny 
extradition, even when the offense on which the extradition request is 
based constitutes a crime in each state and is listed in the treaty as 
extraditable, will be labelled the "special use" of double criminality. Extra- 
dition will be denied when the theory of jurisdiction maintained by the 
requesting state is not accepted by the requested state. 
Id. 
94 This theory is also known as active personality. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra 
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these jurisdictional bases have the potential to cover extraterri- 
torial crimes, an analysis of each shows that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction asserted under any one of these bases may fail. 
a. The territorial basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The 
territorial basis of jurisdiction allows a country to enact domes- 
tic laws which prohibit certain conduct committed within its 
territory.g6 A strict interpretation of territorial jurisdiction re- 
quires that the entire proscribed act be committed within the 
territory of the requested State.g7 Some nations have adopted 
more liberal interpretations of the territorial principle of juris- 
diction, such as subjective and objective territoriality. Subjec- 
tive territoriality provides that if one of the elements of the 
crime is committed within the territory of the requesting na- 
tion, that nation has jurisdiction to prosecute.g8 Objective ter- 
ritoriality is even more liberal, allowing for the prosecution of 
an individual engaged in conduct proscribed by the requesting 
State even when the a d  occurred wholely outside of the 
State." The only requirement here is that the act produce 
harmful effects within the requesting State.''' 
Most nations have adopted the more liberal objective view of 
the territorial basis for jurisdiction. Consequently, "[als long as 
the offense itself, its result or effect, or any of the constituent 
note 11, at 253. 
95. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 687. 
96. SWEENEY, ET AL., supra note 7, at 85-90. 
97. See Blakesley, supra note 93, at  689. 
98. See id. at 691. 
99. For a general discussion of the objective territorial theory of jurisdiction, 
see BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 261-68. 
100. SWEENEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 90-108. The authors also cite the Restate- 
ment on the Law of Foreign Relations 18 (1965) as an express acceptance of this 
liberal view of territorial jurisdiction: 
Id. 
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal 
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an 
effect within its territory, if either 
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent 
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably 
developed legal systems, or 
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to 
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; 
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the 
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of jus- 
tice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal 
systems. 
at 107-08. 
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or material elements actually occur within the sovereign terri- 
tory of the requesting party, assertion of jurisdiction will be 
seen as proper in either state and extradition will be ap- 
proved . . . ."lo' 
b. The protective basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Pro- 
tective extraterritorial jurisdiction exists when an extraterrito- 
rial offense "has or potentially has an adverse effect on or poses 
a danger to a state's security, integrity, sovereignty, or  govern- 
mental    ti on."'^^ Although this definition of protective juris- 
diction sounds similar to the objective territoriality theory,los 
there is a distinction between the two." Under the objective 
territoriality theory, jurisdiction exists if the extraterritorial act 
has any harmful effect within the State. The protective theory 
of jurisdiction, by contrast, allows for the exercise of jurisdic- 
tion over extraterritorial acts even when those acts do not re- 
sult in an effect within the requesting State, but merely consti- 
tute a threat to the requesting State's national security or 
other vital interest.lo5 In other words, whereas objective territo- 
rial jurisdiction requires at least some effect within the State, 
protective jurisdiction requires only apotential effect within the 
State. The breadth of this jurisdictional theory has made it 
attractive to nations searching for ways to convict participants 
in foiled international drug trafficking conspiracies which in- 
tend to have a harmful effect on a nation, but in fact do not 
because they are ~nsuccessful.'~~ 
c. The nationality basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The . 
nationality theory of jurisdiction provides that citizens are enti- 
tled to the protection of their nation "even when they are out- 
101. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 701. 
102. Id. 
103. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
104. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 701. 
105. Id. at 702. Professor Blakesley made the following comment regarding the 
principle of protective jurisdiction: 
The protective principle is designed to allow a state to protect itself 
against and to punish the perpetrators of actual and inchoate offenses 
that damage or threaten to damage state security, sovereignty, treasury 
or governmental functions. It is  the only accepted theory that allows juris- 
diction over conduct that threatens potential danger to the 
above-mentioned interests or functions and, because of the signit"1cant 
dangers it poses to relations among nations, it is limited to  those recog- 
nized and stated interests or functions. 
Id. at 705. 
106. See Bernholz et al., supra note 72, at 370-71. 
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side its territorial bo~ndaries."'~' The rationale for this juris- 
dictional theory is that 
[flrom the perspective of international law, nationals of a 
state remain under that state's personal sovereignty and owe 
their allegiance to it, even though travelling or residing out- 
side its territory. The state has legal authority under interna- 
tional and domestic law, based on that allegiance, to assert 
criminal jurisdiction over actions of one of its nationals 
deemed criminal by that state's laws.108 
Accordingly, in cases of extradition, if both the requesting and 
the requested States recognize this theory of jurisdiction, then 
terrorists and international drug traffickers can be convicted by 
their nation of origin when they commit such activities abroad. 
d. The passive personality basis of extraterritorial juris- 
diction. Under the nationality theory, nationals residing or 
travelling outside of their State are nevertheless subject to its 
jurisdiction when they commit certain crimes. The passive 
personality theory, conversely, provides that a nation has juris- 
diction over those who commit crimes against its citizens while 
they are abroad. The reasoning behind this theory is that 
"[slince the ultimate welfare of the state itself depends upon 
the welfare of its nationals, it can be asserted that a state has 
a legitimate interest in the prosecution of those who have been 
found guilty of committing crimes against its nationals while 
abroad."log This jurisdictional theory is especially popular in 
Europe. For example, France enacted a law in 1975 recognizing 
its right to  prosecute individuals engaged in activities which 
harm French nationals abroad.ll0 Blakesley notes that, "[clo- 
mpared to the other nations of Europe, h c e  was actually 
late in developing the passive personality principle to this ex- 
tent.""' However, other nations, including the United States, 
reject this theory.ln 
e. The universality basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
107. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 288. 
108. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 706 (citations omitted). 
109. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 291. 
110. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 713-14. Clearly the motivation behind the 
enactment of this law was the 1974 Hague incident, in which French nationals 
were taken hostage. Id. 
111. Id. at 715 n.94. 
112. Id. at 715. 
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This basis of jurisdiction is reserved for acts considered univer- 
sally reprehensible. Under this jurisdictional theory, all States 
may participate in the prosecution of individuals engaged in 
such activities because of a common interest in punishing such 
cond~ct."~ Professor Bassiouni gave the following rationale 
for this jurisdictional basis: 
Some offenses, due to their very nature, affect the inter- 
ests of all states, even when committed in a given state or 
against a given state, victim, or interest. Such offenses may 
even be committed in an area not subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of any state, such as the high seas, air space or 
outer space. The gravaman of such an offense is that it consti- 
tutes a violation against mankind. . . . Any state, if it cap- 
tures the offender, may prosecute and punish that person on 
behalf of the world community.114 
This jurisdictional theory has often been applied to acts such as 
piracy, genocide, and various war crimes.'15 
2. "Special use" of dual criminality as a bar to extradition 
Having authority to proscribe extraterritorial conduct is 
only the first step in prosecuting such conduct. An additional 
prosecutorial prerequisite is a showing that the nation seeking 
to enforce its laws has jurisdiction to do so. In the extradition 
context, the requesting State must present a mutually accept- 
able jurisdictional theory before the dual criminality require- 
ment can be satisfied.''' 
Because "jurisdictional issues are determined by the re- 
quested State,""' problems often arise when the basis of the 
requesting State's extraterritorial jurisdiction is not recognized 
by the requested State? When this is the case, the "special 
113. See SWEENEY El' AL., supra note 7, at 118. 
114. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 298. 
115. SWEENEY El' AL., supra note 7, at 118. 
116. Id. at 84-85. This jurisdictional aspect of the dual criminality requirement 
is known as its 'special use." Therefore, satisfaction of dual criminality requires 
not only that the a d  be considered criminal by both the requesting and requested 
States, but that each State recognize the jurisdictional theory invoked by the 
requested State in its attempt to prosecute the fugitive. 
117. BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at  313. 
118. Another problem arising in this area is that of concurrent jurisdiction. 
When both the State requesting extradition and the State receiving the request 
claim to have jurisdiction over an individual, principles of sovereignty may compel 
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use" of the dual criminality requirement may bar extradition 
even when any or all of the traditional bases of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction are invoked by the requesting nation. One area in 
which this has consistently been a problem is drug conspira- 
cies. Although this offense comes close to fitting several of the 
traditional jurisdictional categories, and may fit them in cer- 
tain circumstances, the traditional bases of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction often fail to provide prosecutorid pos~ibilities."~ 
Similarly, acts of international terrorism may go unprosecuted 
because the requesting and requested States cannot agree on a 
mutually acceptable jurisdictional theory.120 
a. "Special use"problems under the territorial basis of extra- 
territorial jurisdiction. This approach is probably the most 
likely to survive the "special use" of the dual criminality re- 
quirement because nearly all nations recognize this principle of 
jurisdi~tion.'~' However, a strict application of this principle 
would often preclude extradition for extraterritorial crimes be- 
cause such an interpretation requires that the act be commit- 
ted wholly inside the boundaries of the nation requesting ex- 
tradition. In cases of international activites such as terrorism 
and drug traffcking, this is rarely the case. Therefore, an ex- 
pansive interpretation of the requirement, such as the objective 
territoriality theory, is necessary. But because not all nations 
have accepted such a broad interpretation, extradition may be 
denied in instances where the requested State does not recog- 
nize the objective territoriality theory. 
Even extradition requests involving nations which have 
accepted the objective territoriality theory may fail because the 
"effect" on the requesting State required by this theory is so 
tenuous that it will not be recognized by the requested 
the requested State to deny the extradition request. See CLYDE EAGLETON, INTER- 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 87 (3d ed. 1957). A detailed discussion of this problem is 
outside the scope of this paper. 
119. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 719-20. 
120. See infrcr notes 121-26 and accompanying text; see also Christopher L. 
Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Legal Protection Against Terrorism; 19 CONN. L. REV. 
895 (1987). The political offense exception also may present a barrier to extradition 
in cases of international terrorism. In addition to his works on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, Professor Blakesley has also discussed extradition and acts of interna- 
tional terrorism in Christopher L. Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political 
offense Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN. J .  INT'L L. & PoL'Y 109 (1986). 
121. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 254. 
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State.'= This is often the case with drug conspiracies, or con- 
spiracies to commit terrorist acts, especially when these con- 
spiracies fail. This would include situations in which perpetra- 
tors are still in the planning stages, or when they are caught 
during an attempt to engage in such activities, but prior to 
doing any actual damage to the requested State? When this 
occurs, even though the intent to commit an act designed to 
have an "effect" on the requested State is clear, intent alone is 
usually not enough to fit squarely under the objective 
territoriality the01y.l~~ In such circumstances, dual crim- 
inality's "special use" may bar extradition. 
b. "Special useDproblems under the protective basis of extra- 
territorial jurisdiction. Many nations refuse to extradite indi- 
viduals when the requesting State asserts the protective theory 
of jurisdiction. A principle reason for the reluctance to  accept 
this theory is its intrusiveness. As Professor Bassiouni noted: 
There is . . . no general rule of international law which 
prohibits the application of this theory either on a restricted 
or an unlimited basis. The potential for using this theory in 
extradition is very vast. Indeed, if the authoritative decision-- 
making process of a given participant is without restriction as 
to what constitutes conduct performed outside its boundaries 
but having an internal effect on its interest, which it deems 
itself competent to protect, then almost every act by any per- 
son which affects the political and economic interest of a state 
could subject such person to the jurisdiction of that state.125 
Because nations do not wish to subject their own nationals 
to such intrusive jurisdiction, they often will refuse extradition 
requests based on this theory. The United States is one such 
nation.126 In addition, because the protective principle is 
"traditionally limited to  offenses that pose a threat to national 
security, sovereignty or some important governmental func- 
tion,"12' some argue that drug conspiracies, and even terror- 
ism, do not constitute such a threat.'" 
122. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 701. 
123. Id. at 755. 
124. Bernholz et al., supra note 72, at 370-71; Blakesley, supra note 93, at 719. 
125. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 297. 
126. See id. 
127. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 720. 
128. See id. 
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c. "Special useBproblems under the nationality basis of extra- 
territorial jurisdiction. The nationality basis of jurisdiction may 
also present "special use" dual criminality problems. Bassiouni 
noted that although this principle of jurisdiction is "universally 
accepted," because "its precise definition and application differs 
widely,"'" the requesting and requested States may not 
agree on the interpretation of nationality jurisdiction posed by 
the requested State. Therefore, under the "special use* of the 
dual criminality requirement, the requested State may be 
forced to deny the extradition request because the two nations' 
conceptions of nationality jurisdiction differ. Given Professor 
Bassiouni's statement, this is not unlikely. 
In addition, because the act is committed in a foreign juris- 
diction, the issue consistently arises as to who should pro- 
secute--the nation of the offender's citizenship, or the nation 
which apprehended the offender. If the a d  is criminal in the 
requested State, that State has the right, under the principle of 
territorial jurisdiction, to prosecute the person committing a 
criminal act within its borders. Because some criminals, espe- 
cially drug trfickers, often have control over governmental 
processes in certain nations, there is a high probability that 
such criminals may ''convince" the requested State to proceed 
itself rather than grant extradition.lsO 
129. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 288. 
130. See Sicalides, supra note 69, at 1316. Professor Sicalides commented on the 
necessity of extradition in such situations: 
Extradition is essential, especially in those cases where the requested 
government is unable to keep major drug traffickers incarcerated because 
of the intimidation, through force and corruption, of public officials. "It is 
the threat of extradition . . . that has drawn the ire of Columbia's drug 
mafia. 'Extradition is the thing they fear the most . . . . Everything else 
is just the cost of doing business."' Extradition is the primary fear of 
these major drug traffickers because it is frequently all that stands be- 
tween themselves and prosecution. 
Id. (citation omitted). Another example of this fear is the recent surrender of many 
of Columbia's top drug cartel members following an offer from the Columbian gov- 
ernment to try them in that country rather than extradite them to the United 
States. TIME recently reported the following: 
SURRENDERED. Jorge Luis Ochoa Vaqpez, 41, No. 2 man of the violent 
Medellin cocaine cartel who is wanted on drug trafficking charges in the 
U.S.; to Colombian authorities; in Caldas, Colombia. The fXth cartel mem- 
ber to turn himself in in recent months, Ochoa took advantage of a Co- 
lombian government promise that traffickers who give up will not be 
extradited to the U.S. Ochoa's move could trigger more surrenders, but 
U.S. officials are concerned that Colombia may treat those who come 
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d. "Special use" problems under the passive personality 
basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Because the passive per- 
sonality theory is not accepted in many juri~dictions,''~ "spe- 
cial use" of dual criminality will ofken bar extradition. Several 
cases illustrate the failure of the passive personality principle 
of jurisdiction to provide for extradition of an individual com- 
mitting an offense against a national of the requesting State. 
In the Abu Daoud case,ls2 Israel requested the extradition of 
Daoud on charges involving the 1972 Munich Olympics massa- 
cre. France was forced to deny the request because it did not 
adhere to the passive personality basis of jurisdiction at the 
time that the massacre occurred. Therefore, the court reasoned 
that the dual criminality requirement could not be satisfied, - 
and Daoud was released. 
The United States has also denied extradition requests for 
similar reasons. In 1940, Mexican officials requested the extra- 
dition of an American citizen "for crimes committed against a 
Mexican national outside Mexican territory."lsg The asserted 
basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction was the passive personality 
principle. The United States denied the request. The State 
Department expressly based its decision on the special use of 
the dual criminality requirement, stating that although Mexico 
had adopted the passive personality principle, the United 
States had not, and therefore extradition was impermiss- 
ible.lM 
e. "Special use" problems under the universality basis of 
forward too leniently, 
Surrendered, TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at 87. 
131. Chief among these is the United States: 
The passive personality theory of jurisdiction is generally considered 
anathematic to United States law. The Restatement (Second) of Foreign 
Relations Law contains the traditional repudiation of the principle: "A 
State does not have the jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law, attaching a 
legal consequence to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on 
the ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals . . . ." [Tlhe Unit- 
ed States government has vehemently protested any assertion of jurisdic- 
tion by foreign courts over acts of United States nationals committed 
against nationals of the forum state outside that state's territory. 
Blakesley, supra note 93, at 715. 
132. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 746-56 (citing 1977 Clunet 843 (Cours d' 
Appel)); see also Mare Poirier, Note, International Terrorism: Extradition, 18 HAW. 
INT~, LJ. 467 (1977) (commenting on the Abu Dmud case). 
133. Blakesley, supm note 93, at 747. 
134. See WHITEMAN, supra note 17, at  104. 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction. The biggest barrier to  recognition 
of this jurisdictional theory is the categorization of an act as 
universally reprehensible. Dual criminality problems arise in 
this context because some nations categorize certain acts as 
universally reprehensible while others do not. For example, 
crimes traditionally fitting within the universality theory have 
been piracy, slavery, and genocide.'" However, "[tlhere is a 
growing trend to include terrorism and traffic in narcotic 
drugs" as universal crimes.lsB If this trend continues, 
countries could then proceed to extradite individuals on these 
charges without fear of the dual criminality requirement bar- 
ring the extradition request. Even so, terrorism and drug 
trafficking have not yet achieved this status.'" Consequently, 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to assert that this basis 
of jurisdiction warranted extradition for these crimes. 
IV. SUGGESTED RESOLUTIONS 
Although the dual criminality requirement has been loose- 
ly interpreted by most courts, and extradition rarely fails be- 
cause of it, when dual criminality does block otherwise legiti- 
mate extradition requests it undermines the very policies be- 
hind permitting extradition. In order to serve the purposes for 
which it exists,'" while not preventing extradition when it 
would be appropriate, certain changes should be implemented. 
Possible changes are the adoption of the proposals of the Tenth 
International Congress of Penal Law ("Tenth International 
Congress"), and/or the rewording of the dual criminality provi- 
sions to  reflect the model presented in a recent amendment of a 
U.S.-West Germany Treaty. A solution to the "special use" of 
the dual criminality requirement would be to  amend extradi- 
tion treaties to  reflect language found in the U.S.Japan ex- 
tradition treaty, and/or to adopt an alternate interpretation of 
the objective territoriality theory of jurisdiction. 
135. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
136. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 718. 
137. Id. at 718-19 (commenting that terrorism and drug trafficking do not war- 
rant categorization as universal crimes); SWEENEY AL., supra note 7, at 118 
("Despite the increase in the number of acts of terrorism in recent years, it is still 
a matter of controversy whether it is a crime of universal interest."). 
138. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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the objective territoriality theory of jurisdiction. 
A. Proposals to Allow Extradition to 
the United States for CCE and RICO Charges 
I .  Adopt proposals of the Tenth International Congress 
The Tenth International Congress, which met in 1969, 
adopted a resolution which mandates that the requested State 
set aside the dual criminality requirement unless special cir- 
cumstances exist.lsg Such special circumstances would involve 
political turmoil in the requesting State or evidence that the 
extradition request is simply subterfuge to return a person for 
political, rather than penological purposes.140 In such a situa- 
tion, the requested State would be under no obligation to extra- 
dite the fugitive because of the political offense ex~eption.'~' 
In addition, a court could use the loose in concreto method of 
applying the dual criminality requirement, and find a way to 
avoid extradition. 142 
Such an approach would permit the United States to pur- 
sue drug traffickers and the like using RICO and CCE charges. 
However, because countries refusing to comply with such a 
resolution would still be able to deny extradition requests un- 
der more strict applications of the dual criminality requirem- 
ent, this solution is potentially incomplete. 
2. Amend extradition treaties to reflect the extradition treaty 
between the United States and West Germany 
A more effective, but perhaps less efficient route to change 
would be to rework existing extradition treaties to reflect the 
language of a recent amendment to a U.S.-West Germany 
extradition treaty. The now amended 1978 version of the dual 
criminality portion of the extradition treaty defines extradit- 
able offenses as follows: 
(1) Extraditable offenses under this treaty are: 
C 
139. 41 Revue Intenationale de droit penal 12 (1970), cited in BASSIOUNI, supra 
note 2, at 322. 
140. Id. 
141. ~ E N E Y  El?AL., supra note 7, at 142. 
142. Id.; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text. This approach has the 
support of Professor Bassiouni. BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 322. 
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(a) Offenses described in the Appendix to this Treaty which 
are punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties; 
(b) Offenses, whether listed in the Appendix to this Treaty or 
not, provided they are punishable under the Federal laws of 
the United States and the laws of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
In this connection it shall not matter whether or not the laws 
of the Contracting Parties place the offense within the same 
category of offenses or denominate an offense by the same 
terminology. 
This version ensures that courts will interpret the dual crimi- 
nality provision in a liberal manner. However, this version falls 
short of the revised version, which reads: 
(1) Extraditable offenses under the Treaty are offenses which 
are punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties. In 
determining what is an extraditable offense it shall not mat- 
ter whether or not the laws of the Contracting Parties place 
the offense within the same category of offense or denominate 
an offense by the same terminology, or whether dual criminal- 
ity follows from Federal, State or Laender [German state] 
laws. In particular, dual criminality may include offenses 
based upon participation in an association whose aims and 
activities include the commission of extraditable offenses, 
such as a criminal society under the laws of the the Federal 
Republic of Germany or an association involved in racketeer- 
ing or criminal enterprise under the laws of the United 
States. 144 
Clearly the improved language of the Treaty is intended to 
resolve some of the problems created by complex criminal stat- 
utes such as RICO and CCE. The new language facilitates 
extradition in cases where both the requesting and the reques- 
ted States wish to extradite but would have been unable to un- 
der the prior language. The modification also includes language 
which eliminates any confusion over choice of law issues." 
143. Treaty between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of 
Germany Concerning Extradition, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., 32 U.S.T. 1485, 
1489, quoted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 334. 
144. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Oct. 21, 1986, US-F.R.G., S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 100-6, 100 Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), quoted in BASSIOUM, supra note 11, at 
335. 
145. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text. Note that the language in 
the treaty makes it clear that whether the law making the conduct criminal stems 
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Although clearly time-consuming, the addition of similar lan- 
guage to all bilateral extradition treaties to which the United 
States is a party would effectively resolve nearly all of the 
problems currently associated with the dual criminality requir- 
ement. 
Another alternative, directly targeted a t  international drug 
crimes, would be a multilateral treaty which would contain 
CCE, RICO, and terrorism charges as extraditable offenses. By 
making such actions internationally criminal, the problem of 
dual criminality would be overcome. This is the approach advo- 
cated by United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de 
Cuellar a t  the forty-fourth General Assembly Se~sion. '~~ 
B. Proposals to Cure the Defects of 
the "Special Use" of Dual Criminality 
The "special use of double criminality . . . often does con- 
tradict general principles of jurisdiction and will cause denial of 
extradition when perhaps it ought to su~ceed."'~' Therefore, 
some changes are in order. There have been several suggested 
resolutions to the "special use" of the dual criminality require- 
ment, especially in cases involving terrorism and international 
drug trade. For example, in an attempt to cure jurisdictional 
problems with the extradition and prosecution of terrorists acts 
committed against United States nationals abroad, Congress 
passed a law in 1986 which provides for extraterritorial juris- 
diction over terrorists acts committed abroad against United 
States nati0na1s.l~~ 
from a federal or a state source, as long as the a d  is criminal, the dual criminal- 
ity requirement is satisfied. 
146. To Crush Crime, Humanize Justice; Preview of the Eighth United Nations 
Crime Congress, 27 UN. CHRONICLE, June 1990, at 41. 
147. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 751. 
148. 18 U.S.C. 2331 (1986); see also, SWEENEY AL., supra note 7 ,  at 123-25 
(providing text of the law, as well as commentary); Brandon S. Chabner, The 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security a d  Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Prescribing and 
Enforcing United States Law Against Terrorist Violence Overseas, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
985 (1990) (discussing potential jurisdictional problems with the new law). The 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, Willliam J. Hughes (D-NJ), 
pointed out at a later session that the bill was drafted in a manner intended to 
avoid conflids with the dual rriminality principle: 
[Wle found that, in drafting the law, particular attention had to be paid 
to another body of law-that relating to international extradition. They go 
hand in hand. Since these offenses are, by definition, committed outside 
our country, we frequently will need to seek the cooperation of another 
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Two problems are presented by the United States' solution 
to the special use of the dual criminality requirement. First, 
the law provides for capital punishment upon conviction. Sev- 
eral nations, including Germany, refuse to  extradite individuals 
who face a possible death sentence because such a penalty is 
not allowed under their laws.14' Second, some nations will 
not recognize the exercise of jurisdiction based upon the nation- 
ality of the victim. Therefore, the fact that the United States 
thinks it has jurisdiction over a particular matter may not con- 
vince the requested State of United States compliance with the 
special use of the dual criminality requirement. Because of 
these problems, exploration of alternative solutions is war- 
ranted. 
1. Adopt language of the United StatesJapan Extradition 
Treaty 
The language of t h e  recently adopted United 
S ta tesJapan  extradition treaty provides a model for circum- 
venting "special use" problems. The applicable language pro- 
vides: 
When the offense for which extradition is requested has been 
committed outside the territory of the requesting Party, the 
requested Party shall grant extradition if the laws of that 
Party provide for the punishment of such an offense commit- 
ted outside its territory, or if the offense has been committed 
by a national of the requesting Party.lbo 
government in extraditing those who murder or assault U.S. nationals. 
With this in mind, we found it necessary to modify the language of 
the law so the requirement of dual criminality is met. Dual criminality 
means that both our country and the country from which we are seeking 
extradition have comparable laws covering the conduct in question. A law 
written in special language describing international terrorism might not 
match up with a similar law in Germany or Japan. We solved this prob- 
lem by making the statute essentially a murder statute which is then 
linked to terrorist-type circumstances by a certification of the Attorney 
General. 
Federal News Service, Hearings of the Crime Subcommittee of the House Judiciary 
Committee on Terrorist Acts Abroad Way 31, 1989). 
149. Id. ("Most countries do not have capital punishment, and several have 
constitutions, statutes, or policies prohibiting extradition of persons who might be 
subject to capital punishment in the requesting country."). 
150. Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Japan, 
March 3, 1978, U.S.-Japan, art. VI, para 1, 31 U.S.T. 892, 897. Note also that 
the requesting nation may use the nationality theory of jurisdiction when appropri- 
19 11 DUAL CRIMINALITY REQUIREMENT 229 
This language expressly prevents the "special use" of dual crim- 
inality from foiling otherwise valid extradition attempts as long 
as the nation has somehow proscribed the conduct, such as 
through the 1986 antiterrorism law. 
2. Alter the objective territoriality basis of jurisdiction by 
adding "Intent to Cause an EffectB 
One method to make extradition of unsuccessful drug con- 
spirators and terrorists possible would be to alter the require- 
ments of the objective territoriality principle by adding that 
any intent to  cause a harmful effect upon the requesting nation 
would fulfill "special use" dual criminality obligations. This 
approach was adopted by a United States court in Republic of 
France v. Moghadam.15' There the court stated that "the 
court may assert jurisdiction over a defendant whose acts were 
done outside of the United States . . . [as long as] the intent to 
cause a detrimental effect [is] clear."'" 
The biggest advantage of this approach would be the re- 
moval of a penalty for apprehending criminals prior to  their 
successful act. Under the current approach, if conspirators are 
apprehended prior to the enactment of their scheme, there has 
been no detrimental effect in the requesting State, and 
therefore there can be no extradition under the traditional 
bases of jurisdiction. If an intent element is added, as long as 
the drug traffickers or terrorists intend to commit an act which 
would detrimentally affect the requesting State, the "special 
use" of dual criminality would not bar extradition if the perpe- 
trators are caught prior to inflicting a harmfbl effect on the 
requesting State. 
Blakesley offers an alternative resolution. He suggests that 
a hybrid theory be adopted which would allow extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to  '%e properly asserted if the offense charged 
meets all but one of the requirements of any two or more tradi- 
tional bases of jurisdiction, even though it does not meet all the 
requirements of any single theory . . . ."lmH i s a p p r o ac h i s  
ate. 
151. 617 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The court nevertheless determined that 
extradition in this case would be improper because no such showing of intent was 
made. 
152. Id. at 787 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
153. Blakesley, supra note 93, at 723. 
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problematic, however, because as noted, nations may not accept 
one of the traditional theories of jurisdiction, and even if they 
do, their conceptualization of the theory may differ from State 
to State. Therefore, a hybrid jurisdictional basis acceptable to 
the requesting nation may still be rejected by the requested 
nation under dual criminality's "special use." 
I t  would be much easier to simply alter the theory most 
acceptable to  all nations-the tefiitorial theory-as suggested 
above.'" If this alteration were limited to instances of com- 
mon interest, such as international drug traffcking and terror- 
ism, even those nations which currently do not accept the liber- 
al objective territoriality theory in all instances may be per- 
suaded to accept it in these limited, but important, circumstan- 
ces. 
The dual criminality requirement has served the purposes 
for which it was created-protection of individual rights. But 
when strictly interpreted, it has become a hindrance to achiev- 
ing the policies underlying extradition itself, such as the sup- 
pression of international crimes of drug trafficking and terror- 
ism. Because the prosecution of these crimes is in both the 
national and international interests, the dual criminality re- 
quirement should be relaxed.'% However, the requirement 
should not be eliminated because the requirement does protect 
certain political interests of nations while preserving important 
rights of the accused. 
Jonathan 0. Hafen 
154. BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 254 ("The theory of territorial jurisdiction [is] 
often referred to as the territorial principle because of its universal recogni- 
tion . . . . This principle, more than any other, is a concomitant of sovereignty; 
and, therefore, all states adhere to the territorial principle."). 
155. In addition to the comments throughout this paper supporting liberalization 
of the dual criminality requirement, see International Legal Notes: Extradition and 
the Proper Scope of the Principle of Doubk Criminality, 54 ATJSFL. LJ. 240 (1980) 
(supporting a liberal reading of the dual criminality reqyjrement). 
